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1.  Introduction 
In recent weeks pressures on the euro and 
eurozone sovereign debtors have subsided. 
Buoyant growth in the global economy, 
increasingly benefiting also the European 
economy, has of course played an important role 
in calming financial markets. But even more 
important has been the perception that France 
and Germany are again working constructively 
for a strong economic Europe. More broadly, the 
acute turbulence in financial markets since the 
spring of 2010 may have finally convinced our 
political leaders, notably including the German 
political establishment, that the benefits of a stable 
currency far outweigh the costs that may have to 
be borne to make it work properly. The euro will 
only be trusted if the member states effectively 
coordinate their economic policies not only to 
ensure fiscal stability, but also to eliminate 
persistent divergences in productivity leading to 
unsustainable imbalances between national 
savings and investment (Schäuble, 2011).   
At its forthcoming spring meeting, on March 
24th-25th, the European Council will consider a 
comprehensive package of measures that can 
open a new age of European economic 
governance: truly collective, rather than 
intergovernmental, and rule-based; capable of 
enforcing economic policy coordination and 
preventing the build-up of unsustainable 
imbalances in government as well as private 
balance sheets; and backed up by credible, quasi-
automatic sanctions for any member state posing 
a threat to collective stability.  
While the broad set of measures required to bring 
about coherent and sustainable macro-financial 
polices has been identified, much confusion 
remains as to what exactly common policies can 
and should do to tackle the sovereign debt crisis 
of ‘peripheral’ eurozone countries. As a result, the 
discussion on the new European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) has been plagued by 
misunderstandings and confusion, often 
amplified by politicians pandering to domestic 
public concerns.  
This Policy Brief aims to contribute to Council 
deliberations first by clarifying the proper role of 
Union financial assistance to member states 
confronted with sovereign debt crises, which 
should in no case cross the line of providing fiscal 
transfers; and, second, by outlining the tasks that 
the new ESM should be able to perform if we 
really want an effective and credible crisis 
management system for both the eurozone and 
the European Union. Proper design of the ESM 
should also allow the debate about euro or, 
rather, Union-bonds to be brought to a fruitful 
conclusion. 
This Brief is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
reviews the key elements under discussion in the 
new EU economic governance. Legal limits of 
financial assistance to member states under the 
TFEU are discussed in section 3, and sovereign 
debt restructuring arrangements in section 4. The 2 |MICOSSI, CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
 
 
ingredients of a credible system for bank crisis 
resolution are described in section 5 and section 6 
then discusses the possible role of Union–bonds 
in facilitating debt restructuring and bank 
resolution, consistent with the no-fiscal-transfer 
Treaty constraint. Finally, section 7 brings the 
pieces together to describe the desirable tasks of 
the ESM. 
2.  EU economic governance: The 
broad picture 
An effective crisis management framework must 
rest on the three pillars of crisis prevention, crisis 
mitigation and crisis resolution (Kapoor, 2010).  
Crisis prevention comprises the new rules on 
policy coordination, including the European 
semester, the revised stability and growth pact 
and the excessive imbalances procedure – which 
can find proper content in stronger economic 
governance effectively concentrating on pro-
competitive market opening structural reforms. 
The critical aspect for success will be procedures 
ensuring that budgetary discipline and other 
policy rules equally apply to all member states. To 
this end, the best guarantee would be semi-
automatic rules under strong surveillance and 
enforcement powers by the European 
Commission, assisted by reverse majority voting 
in the Council on all Commission 
recommendations. Experience has shown over 
and over again that intergovernmental decision-
making and peer pressure will not suffice, as once 
again Verhofstadt, Delors and Prodi (2011) 
forcefully reminded us in their recent editorial in 
the Financial Times. Moreover, as has been 
argued by Amato et al. (2010), the common 
economic policies must rest on the twin legs of 
financial stability and a strategy capable of 
durably raising the growth of output and 
productivity throughout the eurozone. Without 
the growth leg, the stability leg is also bound to 
falter. 
A central role in preventing a repetition of 
financial excesses of the past decade will be 
played by financial regulation (Visco, 2011). 
Stronger rules on capital and liquidity standards 
for banks, risk-based deposit insurance, central 
clearing for derivatives and new governance rules 
for financial institutions (e.g. on remuneration 
and risk control) are all in the pipeline and should 
deliver a structurally stronger financial system.  
It is also critically important to contain pro-
cyclicality of the financial system, basically by 
empowering national central banks, under a 
common ECB procedure, to vary capital and 
reserve requirements for anti-cyclical purposes 
(De Grauwe, 2010). This is not only an issue 
internal to the financial system, as such already 
under intense examination in the Basel III 
framework, but a broader issue of macroeconomic 
stability: in an economic area where financial 
integration is more advanced than labour and 
services market integration, the single monetary 
policy may result in divergent real interest rates, 
leading locally to unwanted credit expansions or 
contractions – as was notably the case in Ireland 
and Spain in the past decade. This problem may 
soon become a hot issue, if the ECB decides to 
raise interest rates in response to strong demand 
and accelerating wages in Germany while the 
periphery still is in the doldrums. 
On crisis mitigation, the panoply of instruments 
deployed by the EU has on the whole succeeded – 
albeit at larger costs than necessary due to 
publicly voiced disagreements between key 
member states on the nature and scope of 
assistance to distressed sovereign debtors 
(Micossi, 2010). The European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), along with 
decisive action by the ECB, have finally convinced 
financial markets that a disorderly default of a 
eurozone member state is not in the cards. The 
key question now is how to manage the transition 
from temporary liquidity assistance to medium-
term support for the time needed by distressed 
sovereign debtors to regain access to private 
financing.  
A stable financial system requires strong rules to 
ensure that all debtors must pay back their debts 
or confront bankruptcy. This is the issue of crisis 
resolution: a key component of financial 
regulation whose design in the Union is not yet in 
sight – despite the loud calls for ‘haircuts’ on 
private creditors by virtuous eurozone members. 
However, sovereign debt restructuring can only 
happen if there is a credible system for bank crisis 
resolution. Indeed, it was reckless lending by 
core-country eurozone banks that made it ON THE TASKS OF THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM| 3 
 
 
possible for the periphery to accumulate 
unsustainable debts – both by the public and the 
private sector (see also Bruton, 2011). The 
discussion about making the private sector share 
in the costs of reckless borrowing by sovereign 
debtors inevitably is at the same time a discussion 
about making banks write off the losses on their 
bloated sovereign portfolios – with all the 
consequences this would entail for bank capital. 
The main source of moral hazard in the financial 
system of the eurozone has been the implicit 
promise that banks would be bailed out by 
governments: a promise made good once again 
by the Greek and Irish rescue packages, which 
have exempted banks from all losses and have 
placed their losses squarely on taxpayers’ 
shoulders. In the absence of arrangements making 
it possible for large cross-border banks within the 
eurozone to take large losses and even fail 
without destroying the entire financial system, 
bankers may soon revert to excessive risk-taking 
in the well-founded belief that taxpayers will pay 
for their mistakes. And, as a result, market 
discipline will remain weak also on sovereign 
debtors. 
3.  Financial assistance without fiscal 
transfers 
Before venturing into the discussion of debt 
restructuring and resolution procedures, it is wise 
to recall briefly the legal limits posited by the 
Treaty on financial support granted by a Union 
institution or the member states, individually and 
collectively, to a member state experiencing 
serious difficulties in its balance of payments or 
that has lost access to private credit markets. 
Article 125 TFEU contains the so-called ‘no-bail-
out’ provision, whereby neither the Union nor a 
member state “shall be liable for or assume the 
commitments of” any public body or entity of any 
member state, “without prejudice to mutual 
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a 
specific project”. This certainly excludes any 
possibility of direct fiscal transfers from one 
member state to another, in order to help the 
latter meet its debt obligations, as well as the 
assumption of guarantees for those liabilities.  
It does allow, however, for the possibility of 
separate and joint guarantees for a joint project, 
an expression that may well include financial 
assistance to a member state, provided two 
conditions are met:  
i.  financial assistance provided to a member state 
must respond to the purpose of preserving 
financial stability, that is to avoid unwanted 
systemic fallout from a local crisis and,  
ii.  financial assistance to a member state, or any 
other operation undertaken in that connection, 
does not result in a fiscal transfer to the 
member state concerned or a guarantee for its 
liabilities. 
The possibility of granting financial assistance to a 
member state is already recognized explicitly in 
the TFEU:  
i.  for a non-eurozone country, when the member 
state is experiencing balance-of-payments 
difficulties of a magnitude that may jeopardize 
the functioning of the internal market or the 
implementation of the common commercial 
policy (Article 143); and 
ii.  for a eurozone country, resort can be made to 
Article 122.2, providing that the member state 
“is in difficulties or seriously threatened with 
severe difficulties caused by natural disasters 
or exceptional occurrences beyond its control.” 
This article indeed provided the legal basis for 
granting financial assistance to Greece and for 
establishing the eurozone emergency package 
in May 2010. 
Thus, as noted by Pisani-Ferry (2010), there was 
never a ‘no-assistance principle’ in the Treaty. 
What may be questioned, and has been 
questioned, is whether Greece and Ireland, and 
possibly others, are falling ‘in difficulties’ as a 
result of events beyond their control or rather 
their own policy mistakes. On one hand, the 
financial crisis was a global phenomenon 
originating beyond their borders; on the other 
hand, its consequences were exacerbated by 
domestic policies and, in the case of Greece, overt 
violation of the stability and growth pact 
(aggravated by false reporting). This question 
may at all events be beside the point, to the extent 
that one country’s policy mistakes may 
destabilize the entire eurozone financial system 
regardless of its causes.  
Precisely to overcome any ambiguity on the 
legality of financial assistance, at its last meeting, 
on 16-17 December 2010, the European Council 4 |MICOSSI, CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
 
 
decided to modify Article 136 of the TFEU by 
adding a paragraph that will establish a 
permanent stability mechanism able to provide 
financial assistance to a eurozone member state 
when this is “indispensable to safeguard the 
stability of the euro area as a whole”. Financial 
assistance will be provided “upon request and 
under strict conditionality” (cf. European Council 
Conclusions, Annex I). Resort for this Treaty 
amendment to the accelerated procedure of 
Article 48.6 of the TEU reflects agreement in the 
Council that no change is involved in Union 
competencies but it is rather a matter of clarifying 
what was already legal.  On financial assistance to 
the member states, it is worth quoting again 
Wolfgang Schäuble’s speech at Humboldt 
University last January, where he clearly stated 
that the assistance measures to Greece and Ireland 
“are compatible with our constitutional and 
European law … The loans are not transfers. And 
they are not gifts. ... And the conditionality is such 
that the country is compelled to enforce measures 
that would have been unthinkable before the 
event.”  
Financial assistance may well take different 
forms, provided it helps alleviate the member 
state’s difficulties: extending a loan to rollover 
sovereign debt, but also intervening in distressed 
markets to restore normal conditions, or 
exchanging Union bonds for sovereign debt held 
by the private sector, provided it is undertaken at 
market prices, would all qualify as permissible 
acts of financial assistance.  
In sum, under the Treaty the ESM may be 
entrusted to provide financial assistance to a 
eurozone member state, and raise the necessary 
means by issuing Union bonds, but would not be 
allowed to use this money to transfer 
permanently resources to the member state 
concerned, or provide guarantees on its sovereign 
debt, since this would violate the no-bail-out 
clause of Article 125. As long as these conditions 
are respected, a decision by the member states to 
guarantee ESM obligations jointly, rather than 
separately and pro-quota as under the present 
EFSF arrangements, would seem fully compliant 
with the Treaty. 
4. Debt restructuring  
The financial assistance programmes for Greece 
and Ireland have provided bridging finance for a 
limited period – until 2013 – but have not restored 
debt sustainability, among other things because 
the cost of financing is well above nominal 
growth and private creditors have not been asked 
to share losses, placing an unbearable burden on 
taxpayers, which is undermining the economic as 
well as political sustainability of corrective 
measures (Buiter and Rahbari, 2010; and 
Eichengreen, 2010). Table 1, based on recent 
estimates by The Economist, summarizes debt 
sustainability indicators for the two countries that 
already receive financial assistance, as well as 
Portugal and Spain. 
 
Table 1. Sovereign debt sustainability in eurozone periphery (% of GDP, unless stated) 
 
Gross government debt     
2010 estimate        2015 f'cast 
Primary 
budget 
adjustment, 
2010-15 f'cast 
Net 
international 
investment 
position, 2009 
Gov't bonds 
held abroad1 
(%) 
10-yr gov't 
bond yield2 
(%) 
Greece 140.2  165  10  -89.1  58  11.3 
Ireland 97.4  125  13  -102.5  54.2  8.3 
Portugal 82.8  100  8  -113.2  66  6.8 
Spain 64.4  85  10  -95.7  38.7  5.5 
1 Q3 2010. 
2 12 January 2011. 
Source: The Economist, 15 January 2011. MICOSSI WITH CARMASSI & PEIRCE 
 
As may be seen, even after fairly dramatic 
adjustments in the primary balance, neither 
Greece nor Ireland can stop, let alone reverse, the 
increase in debt-to-GDP ratios, which in 2015 are 
forecast to top respectively 165% and 125%. The 
effective cost of Union/IMF financial assistance, 
in both instances at close to 6%, is in part 
responsible for this adverse debt dynamics, since 
it largely exceeds the nominal growth rate of GDP 
(with an estimated average in 2011-15 of around 
2% for Greece and 3.5% for Ireland, with a slower 
profile in the early programme years).1  And 
market interest rates on their sovereign bonds are 
h i g h e r  s t i l l ,  p r e c l u d i n g  a n y  r e t u r n  t o  p r i v a t e  
markets any time soon. 
Portugal’s public finances are in less dire 
conditions, but the country suffers from a large 
exposure to foreign markets, which makes its 
financial position vulnerable to sudden changes 
in market confidence. While the desire to avoid 
asking for financial assistance is understandable, 
an early decision to seek such assistance may 
calm markets and reduce the required adjustment 
effort – provided of course the assistance does not 
come yet again at a punitive cost. As for Spain, 
the probability that it may need financial 
assistance seems slim, especially after the 
measures taken recently to strengthen the savings 
banks (Cajas de Ahorros). Despite its high debt-
to-GDP ratio, Italy has managed to keep off the 
radar screen of short-sellers by its prudent fiscal 
policies. 
All in all, barring new unforeseen shocks to the 
world economy, it seems unlikely that the total 
bill of financial assistance to the eurozone 
periphery will exceed the maximum total 
available under last May’s Council package, i.e. 
€750 billion (including €250 billion committed by 
the IMF) – keeping in mind that, in order to make 
the promise effective, the guarantees offered by 
the core eurozone members for utilization of the 
eurozone facility will have to be raised.  
                                                            
1 Cf. for Greece, IMF (2010), “Greece: Second Review 
under the Stand-By Arrangement-Staff Report; Press 
Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and 
Statement by the Executive Director for Greece”, 
December. For Ireland, cf. IMF (2010), “Ireland: 
Request for an Extended Arrangement—Staff Report; 
Staff Supplement; Staff Statement; and Press Release 
on the Executive Board Discussion”, December. 
On the other hand, liquidity support cannot 
resolve a solvency problem. Failure to address the 
issue of solvency with proper instruments will 
only exacerbate adjustment costs and raise the 
spectre of disorderly default, with high risks of 
financial fallouts on the entire eurozone. Clearly, 
financial assistance to Greece and Ireland will 
need to be provided well beyond the current three 
years period, and adjustment programmes will 
need to be revised to lengthen debt repayment 
and make private creditors take their fair share of 
losses. Therefore, there is little doubt that the 
Union urgently needs effective arrangements for 
debt restructuring – even if this might entail the 
need for creditor banks to recapitalize (Kapoor, 
2010; Gros and Mayer, 2011).  
Traditionally, two main approaches have been 
proposed to debt restructuring: a centralized 
statutory approach and decentralized resolution 
entrusted to agreements between private parties, 
in both cases assisted by appropriate legal 
provisions.  
The statutory approach, as prominently 
advocated by the IMF in the early 2000s (Krueger, 
2002), and more recently by Lamandini (2010), 
requires a transnational unified legal bankruptcy 
framework and an international court to manage 
the procedure and adjudicate controversies in 
individual cases. In rejecting the proposal as 
overly centralized, the US Treasury advocated a 
market-based contractual mechanism with 
‘carrots and sticks’ incentives. According to this 
approach, creditors and debtors would be 
encouraged to write in their contracts provisions 
relating to debt restructuring – prominent among 
them collective action clauses that would allow a 
qualified majority of the holders of a bond issue 
(typically 75%) to take decisions on a change of 
the terms of the debt which is also binding for the 
minority, thus overcoming creditor free-riding 
problems. In both cases the legal framework must 
include provisions for stay of execution, following 
the model of Chapter 11 and Chapter 9 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code.2  
The voluntary decentralized approach seems 
better fitting for the EU – also in view of the 
                                                            
2 The latter imposes an automatic stay on creditor 
claims against a municipal or county government, so 
a s  t o  g i v e  t h e  s o v e r e i g n  d e b t o r  s u f f i c i e n t  t i m e  t o  
formulate a restructuring plan and obtain creditor 
approval.  6 |MICOSSI, CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
 
 
hurdles involved in creating a single bankruptcy 
framework for its diverse membership. Under 
this approach, an EU directive or, better, a 
regulation could establish broad principles and 
guidelines to be followed in all sovereign debt 
contracts that would facilitate restructuring 
negotiations – and nothing more, so as to avoid 
formidable legal obstacles (Alexander, 2010).3  In 
December 2010 the European Council has already 
agreed that all sovereign bond issues by eurozone 
countries should carry collective action clauses 
starting in June 2013. 
The main benefit of market-based solutions is that 
they minimize financial disruptions since they are 
already discounted by financial markets; it is 
debatable whether the cost of sovereign debt will 
increase or decrease. A key issue is under what 
circumstances creditors and debtors may find it 
preferable to agree out of court on changing 
outstanding contracts rather than respectively 
claiming full payment in court or stopping 
payments. As a general principle, a creditor will 
agree on ‘haircuts’ if a reduction in nominal 
claims increases his total expected payment flow 
(Krugman, 1988). His incentive to come forward 
and negotiate in good faith may be strengthened 
in certain cases – e.g. impaired credits in banks 
balance sheets – by strict prudential rules on 
write-offs. As for insolvent debtors, early 
recognition of the problem may be encouraged by 
the existence of a credible framework for debt 
restructuring, while moral hazard may be tackled 
by tough conditionality.4  
In the wake of this debate, the paramount 
example of (quasi-) voluntary restructuring was 
the Brady Plan launched in 1989 by the US 
administration to resolve the Mexican sovereign 
debt crisis. Banks holding Mexican sovereigns 
accepted to exchange them at an agreed discount 
with new Mexican government securities backed 
by US Treasuries as collateral for the principal, 
                                                            
3  Alexander also advocates the creation of an EU 
sovereign debt agency, which we do not regard as 
necessary. 
4 In any event, the notion that sovereign debtors will 
only base their decision to default on their debt 
strictly on economic optimization, as e.g. in Buiter 
and Rahbari (2010), is not convincing, since it 
underplays the domestic political and social costs of 
s u c h  a  d e c i s i o n  ( f o r  m o r e  o n  t h i s ,  s e e  B i n i  S m a g h i ,  
2010).     
while the Mexican government set up an escrow 
account for securing interest payments. The IMF 
and the World Bank lent Mexico the money 
required to purchase the Treasuries to be set aside 
as collateral for the new debt (Buchheit, 2010). The 
scheme was later used to restructure the 
sovereign debt of other emerging countries. This 
solution was attractive to banks because it averted 
an outright default, and to the Mexican 
government because it allowed a negotiated 
reduction in the debt burden down to 
manageable proportions. And yet, perhaps an 
agreement wouldn’t have been forthcoming 
without strong pressure from the US government, 
pointing to the useful catalyzing role of public 
authorities in cajoling the parties to make serious 
concessions.     
A market-based solution to debt restructuring 
that shares some features of the Brady Plan has 
been proposed by Gros and Mayer (2011). In their 
approach, the ESM would issue Union bonds to 
buy sovereign distressed debt at market price, 
and then turn it back to the issuer with conditions 
set under the financial assistance programme. The 
key issue once again is to convince creditors to 
swap their sovereign bond holdings at market 
price, thus immediately taking the full loss on 
their distressed sovereigns: as already mentioned, 
tougher prudential rules on loss recognition by 
banks may play a central role in this connection. 
Further credit enhancement as under the Brady 
Plan may also be advisable. We will come back to 
this scheme in section 7. We must now turn our 
attention to bank crisis resolution, the other main 
element required – together with sovereign debt 
restructuring rules – in order to combat moral 
hazard in the financial system and restore market 
discipline. 
5.  Bank crisis resolution 
As has been argued, unsustainable sovereign debt 
accumulation by certain eurozone governments is 
closely intertwined with reckless lending by core 
eurozone banks, directly to the government in the 
Greek case and in the Irish case to the private 
sector which later fell back onto the government. 
Restoring debt sustainability will not be feasible 
unless the banks take their share of losses on bad 
loans. Strong crisis management and resolution 
procedures for the banks are required both to let 
losses fully emerge and to make sure that banks 
will not repeat the same mistakes in the future. ON THE TASKS OF THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM| 7 
 
 
What follows summarizes the recommendations 
of a CEPS Task Force on bank crisis resolution 
(Carmassi et al., 2010). 
A coherent and comprehensive approach to bank 
crisis resolution should be based as much as 
possible on existing powers and institutional 
arrangements; given the challenges posed by the 
heterogeneity across national rules on crisis 
management and resolution, legal changes should 
be sought only as strictly required. Full 
harmonization of bankruptcy laws is in general 
not necessary, as long as all the member states 
adhere to a number of key principles for bank 
crisis management and resolution.  
First, all the member states should have similar 
administrative powers for early corrective action 
and resolution of a bank crisis, as recommended 
by the Basel Supervisors (BCBS, 2009): they would 
include the power to order recapitalization, 
change management, dispose of assets and create 
a bridge bank that would take over the good 
assets of an entity heading for liquidation.  
Second, crisis prevention, resolution and 
liquidation would all be part of a unified crisis 
management and resolution procedure managed 
for each bank or banking group on a consolidated 
basis by the supervisory authority of the parent 
company, assisted by a College of supervisors 
comprising representatives from all the countries 
where the banking group has branches or 
subsidiaries. Consolidated resolution is important 
to avoid ring-fencing and country-by-country 
actions that would aggravate the crisis and 
damage the internal market. Supervisory action 
should be triggered by reference to regulatory 
capital requirements, with a strong presumption 
to act imposed on supervisors, so as to minimize 
room for supervisory forbearance. 
Third, consolidated resolution requires delegation 
of supervisory and resolution powers from the 
supervisors in the countries hosting subsidiaries 
to the supervisors of the parent company: these 
powers would be exercised within the Colleges of 
supervisors set up for each cross-border banking 
group, which would ensure full exchange of 
information and coordinated decision-making. 
The consolidation criteria are straightforward: 
branches would all be consolidated, as well as 
subsidiaries that would not be able to stand alone 
in case of resolution of the parent company. 5 
In order to make group resolution possible, all 
European banking groups would be required to 
prepare and regularly update a document 
detailing the full consolidated structure of legal 
entities that depend on the parent company for 
their survival, and a clear description of 
operational – as distinct from legal – 
responsibilities and decision-making, notably 
regarding functions centralized with the parent 
company. The document should also include 
contingency plans describing possible recovery 
and winding-up arrangements, also updated on 
an ongoing basis, taking account of key factors 
such as size, interconnectedness, complexity and 
dependencies. In preparing their plans, banks 
would be free to decide the structure and 
organization of their business, notably regarding 
the decision to set up branches or subsidiaries in 
the foreign jurisdictions where they operate.  
Fourth, the Colleges of supervisors would report 
to the European Banking Authority (EBA), which 
would sanction all proposals by the Colleges with 
its own decisions. These decisions would include 
the initiation of mandated action and all 
subsequent steps as well as the mediation of 
disputes between national supervisors. This 
adjudication role of EBA is essential to ensure fair 
treatment of all interested parties in all the 
jurisdictions involved, and thus legitimize the 
delegation of supervisory powers. Equally 
important is the presumption to act when the 
(consolidated) capital of the parent company falls 
below certain thresholds, because this provides 
extra assurance to countries hosting the bank’s 
subsidiaries that supervisory forbearance will not 
be used to favour national interests in the parent 
company’s jurisdictions, to the detriment of other 
stakeholders. 
Under this scheme, liquidation would commence 
only after all other remedies have failed. The 
primary purpose of the liquidation would be to 
preserve and optimize the residual bank assets for 
                                                            
5 Separate resolution of subsidiaries, eschewing 
consolidation in the parent group, would only be 
allowed to the extent that they would be 
demonstrably fully independent of the parent 
company, would be unaffected by its liquidation and 
would not endanger its survival in case the subsidiary 
were wound up. 8 |MICOSSI, CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
 
 
the satisfaction of creditors, and residual claims 
by shareholders; it would be managed before 
national courts under existing rules for 
coordination of jurisdictions. At that point a 
bridge bank would already have taken over all 
deposits and other ‘sound’ banking activities, 
thus ensuring their continuity. All other assets 
and liabilities, together with the price received for 
the transfer of assets to the bridge bank, would 
remain in the ‘residual’ bank, which would be 
stripped of its banking licence. An administrator 
for the liquidation of the residual bank would be 
appointed to determine its value and satisfy 
creditors according to the legal order of priorities, 
based on the law of the parent company and the 
other jurisdictions involved. 
6.  Union bonds 
In the discussions of sovereign crisis management 
within the eurozone, a number of schemes have 
been proposed to substitute Union bonds for 
national sovereign debts, with allegedly 
substantial gains for everyone stemming from 
credit risk and liquidity enhancement. While the 
schemes differ as to the purpose, amount and 
guarantee mechanisms, in all cases the bonds 
would be issued by a new specialized agency 
sometimes referred to as European Debt Agency. 
However, it seems quite obvious that, while an 
agency would indeed be required for issuing the 
bonds, in practice any such task could be taken up 
by the ESM (once of course the member states had 
agreed on its scope of action); therefore 
institutional arrangements do not seem important 
in discriminating between the different schemes 
and may be disregarded at this stage. 
A more relevant distinction is that between the 
schemes that apply to all eurozone sovereign debt 
and those specifically targeted at easing the debt 
burden of distressed sovereign borrowers.6 
The former schemes envisage a large-scale 
substitution of national debts with jointly-issued 
bonds, up to a maximum ratio to GDP 
corresponding to some acceptable level of 
indebtedness – e.g. the 60% ratio required by the 
Maastricht criterion, as in Delpla and von 
                                                            
6 Union bonds can be used for other Treaty purposes, 
including financing investment in common projects of 
European interest, as advocated by Monti (2010a) and 
President Barroso’s “Europe 2020 Project Bond 
Initiative”.  
Weiszäcker (2010) and Messori (2011), or lower 
for extra prudence (e.g. 40% in Monti, 2010b, 50% 
in Juncker–Tremonti, 2010). In Delpla and von 
Weiszäcker (2010), all eurozone member states 
may participate, but some could decide not to do 
it: therefore, the quality of Union bonds could 
vary depending on participation. In practice, the 
scheme could lead to the creation of a Triple A 
club of Union bond issuers since low-rated 
sovereign borrowers would in all likelihood not 
join the scheme for fear of confronting 
skyrocketing costs on their remaining ‘red’ 
national bonds, whose risk of default would in all 
likelihood increase more than proportionately. 
These schemes assume that there are substantial 
gains to be reaped, in terms of borrowing costs, 
from the creation of a large and deep market for 
Union bonds – assuming the Union bonds would 
always obtain the Triple A rating. The unspoken 
hope of additional gains from seignorage, like in 
the US experience, also looms large in the 
background (but is anathema for German 
financial probity). The large scale conversion of 
Union bonds for national bonds could also bring 
the extra benefit of reducing the risk of a 
confidence crisis on the weak sovereign debtors 
spreading by contagion to all eurozone sovereign 
markets. 
On the other hand, while the lowly-rated 
sovereigns would benefit from a reduction in 
credit risk, the highly-rated issuers would in all 
likelihood lose on this score, regardless of 
whether the bonds were separately guaranteed 
pro-quota or jointly guaranteed by all eurozone 
sovereign issuers. Unfortunately, empirical 
evidence indicates that market spreads over the 
best (Triple A) paper are in the main determined 
by credit risks, and that large liquidity gains are 
simply not there – except for certain small highly-
rated issuers or during periods of acute tensions 
in financial markets (Favero and Missale, 2010).  
Moreover, any massive substitutions of Union for 
national bonds would seem to violate Article 125 
of TFEU since the conditions for financial 
assistance under the Treaty would not be met, 
and any such operation would amount to some 
degree to the joint assumption of liabilities for 
national public debts: certainly so if Union bonds 
were guaranteed jointly, but in all likelihood also 
with separate guarantees pro-quota, since a pro-
quota default would damage all the member ON THE TASKS OF THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM| 9 
 
 
states and the eurozone as an issuer. Favero and 
Missale (2010) have also pointed out the 
considerable cost and management difficulties 
that would need to be overcome to coordinate 
national debt issues over time and establish a 
stable and predictable flow of the newly-issued 
bonds. All in all, political opposition would in all 
likelihood be insurmountable, since it is utterly 
unthinkable that German public opinion would 
ever accept any scheme entailing massive 
substitution of Union bonds for national bonds, 
which would inevitably weaken market discipline 
and enhance moral hazard, and possibly entail 
German guarantees for periphery government 
debt (Gros and Mayer, 2011). 
Similar difficulties do not arise when Union 
bonds are issued by Union institutions for specific 
common purposes stemming from the Treaty or 
recognized by legislation; in this case the joint 
guaranty for the bonds is also a direct 
consequence of the Union legal order. For 
instance, the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
issues bonds guaranteed by its capital and 
ultimately by its members, to finance investment 
projects of common interest meeting statutory 
quality requirements. Its bonds clearly fall under 
the label of “joint execution of a specific project” 
in Article 125.  
The decision to have the new ESM issue Union 
bonds to provide financial assistance to distressed 
members of the eurozone may also be seen as a 
specific project in the sense of Article 125 – 
although it is preferable to explicitly underpin the 
legality of such operations by means of an 
amendment of Article 136, as the Council has 
decided to do. As has been argued, a joint 
guarantee on ESM bonds by eurozone member 
states would not violate Article 125 of the TFEU to 
the extent that the ESM activities would respect 
the so-called ‘no-bailout’ condition: i.e., that the 
ESM “would not be liable for or assume the 
commitments” of national public borrowers. This 
is precisely the case, for instance, with the Gros 
and Mayer (2011) proposal to open a window at 
the ESM where creditors may exchange national 
debt with ESM-issued Union bonds at prevailing 
market prices. 
7.  The European Stability Mechanism  
We now have all the building blocks required to 
decide what the ESM should and should not do, 
consistent with the no-bailout Treaty prohibition 
but also the need to effectively resolve the debt 
crisis in the eurozone and restore durable 
financial stability.  
The ESM should be empowered to issue bonds 
for “the execution of a specific project” as under 
Article 125 TFEU and/or to grant financial 
assistance as under new Article 136 TFEU for 
eurozone member states. Any operation 
undertaken by the ESM should not result in a 
fiscal transfer or an assumption of credit risk 
exposure to the member state concerned, or a 
guarantee for its liabilities.  
Financial assistance to distressed sovereign 
debtors should go beyond providing temporary 
liquidity support and be granted for the period 
necessary to restore debt sustainability and 
normal access to private capital markets. To this 
end, adjustment programmes should explicitly 
assess debt sustainability and financing gaps, and 
provide a framework for debt restructuring when 
needed. In practice, when debt sustainability is 
not assured, the debtor should be encouraged to 
start negotiations with its creditors on suitable 
changes in debt terms and conditions, as a 
preliminary condition for financial assistance and 
approval of the adjustment programme. 
Independent assessments by the Commission and 
the IMF would offer an objective reference for 
negotiations between the debtor country and its 
creditors.7 
The inclusion of debt sustainability among the 
conditions of financial assistance is key to 
respecting the no-bailout condition since it will 
ensure that the ESM will not take upon itself any 
sovereign debt liability; it will also reduce the 
probability of financial market turmoil due to 
weak credibility of adjustment programmes, as 
has been experienced in the recent past.      
However, this standard financial assistance will 
not suffice, and more will be needed. The ESM 
should also be entitled to intervene to help the 
                                                            
7 Axel Weber (2011) has proposed that the maturity of 
sovereign debt be automatically extended by 3 years 
for countries applying for aid under the ESM so as to 
give distressed countries the time to implement the 
adjustment programme and consolidate public 
finances. We wonder, however, whether a case-by-
case evaluation of debt restructuring would not be 
preferable in order to ensure that the costs of debt 
restructuring are minimized and fairly allocated. 10 |MICOSSI, CARMASSI AND PEIRCE 
 
 
member states recapitalize their banking system 
as required by emerging losses on restructured 
sovereign debts, keeping in mind that Europe’s 
banking system still is undercapitalized and 
exposed to new shocks (Gros, 2011).  
The feared impact of sovereign debt insolvency 
on the banking system has indeed been the main 
channel of contagion in the eurozone financial 
system: therefore, it is only rational to use the 
ESM to tame it by offering eurozone member 
states adequate means to keep their banks well 
capitalised, should national resources prove 
inadequate. Of course, this kind of financial 
assistance should also come under appropriate 
conditions, placing emphasis on regulatory 
reform and strengthened prudential rules for 
banking and financial systems. It could be part of 
a broader adjustment programme or be granted 
solely in connection with decisive bank 
recapitalization.   
Finally, as has been suggested by Gros and Mayer 
(2011), the ESM should be allowed to swap its 
own liabilities with large volumes of distressed 
sovereign debt held in private portfolios, at 
current market valuation – which would be 
instrumental in facilitating voluntary debt 
restructuring of countries already under a 
financial assistance programme. By using the 
swap technique the transaction would not affect 
the market price, thus avoiding unwarranted 
benefits for the debtor.  
In all these instances, the ESM holdings of 
sovereign debt would then be sold back to the 
debtor under the financial assistance programme 
framework, so as to ensure that the debtor 
benefits from the attendant debt reductions, but 
also that those benefits are strictly used to 
accelerate return to full debt sustainability.8 The 
ESM would remain temporarily exposed to some 
market risk on its debt holding, but would in no 
case participate in restructuring losses, which 
would only be shared by the sovereign debtor 
and private creditors. Thus, this type of 
intervention would not amount to a direct 
extension of credit or guarantee on national debts.  
It has been suggested (including by one of these 
authors) that the ESM should be empowered to 
                                                            
8 This is a better alternative to the Brady solution of 
asking debtors to purchase collateral with additional 
financial assistance funds.  
purchase distressed sovereign debt in the 
secondary market so as to relieve the ECB from 
this type of intervention at times of acute market 
distress. So far the burden has fallen on the ECB 
system, which is providing finance to distressed 
governments and banking systems through 
national rediscount facilities, lower quality of 
eligible collateral and market purchases of 
sovereigns – operations that are not easy to 
reverse as long as the underlying solvency 
problem remains unresolved. The longer the ECB 
is forced to support sovereign debt markets, the 
higher the risk that its activities will trespass the 
border of providing inflationary finance to 
distressed sovereign debtors. 
However, the ESM seems ill-suited for 
undertaking market interventions. Perhaps a 
better alternative would be to leave these 
operations in the hands of the ECB but enable the 
ESM to purchase sovereign paper in the ECB 
portfolio, at prevailing market prices, when 
market conditions do not allow the ECB to 
reverse its purchases in the market. The ECB 
would no longer be stuck with low-rating 
government paper, while the ESM would be able 
to dispose of them within the broader context of 
the financial assistance programme to that 
particular sovereign debtor.  
One aspect that requires further reflection is the 
decision by the European Council to grant 
seniority status to all ESM financing. Our analysis 
indicates that it is not strictly necessary to respect 
the no-fiscal-transfer condition, while Gros (2010) 
has convincingly argued that it will increase the 
probability of default of all other outstanding 
debts. Perhaps the Council should reconsider this 
decision, which may on paper reassure certain 
domestic public opinion but de facto make the 
return to overall debt sustainability more difficult. 
As has been argued, once the remit of the ESM 
has been clearly defined so as to exclude any 
fiscal transfer or guarantee for national sovereign 
debt, it would logically follow that the ESM’s 
liabilities should be separately and jointly 
guaranteed by all the eurozone members: this 
would maximise the gains in credit risk and 
liquidity for the issuer while not in the least 
exposing it to any greater sovereign risk. 
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